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Abstract
This paper addresses three institutions in Madurese santri culture: the 
pesantren (Islamic traditional education system), the Nahdlatul Ulama, and 
the kiai (tradisional Islamic authority). These three elements have characterised 
and become central part of  both Islam and politics in Madura. The issues are 
raised in this paper: the nature of  pesantren, the role of  Nahdlatul Ulama, 
and kiais within the whole tradition of  santri Islam in Madura. How does 
each of  these elements form relationships with the others? These questions lead 
to answer the main question: Is Islam in Madura different from Islam in other 
places in Indonesia? Today, it seems clear that despite their rather changed 
perceptions of  modern education, Islamic associations, and men of  religion, 
Madurese people continue to preserve their sacred values, as the main three 
elements of  the santri culture in Madura which have had a great influence on 
society, in both religious and worldly domains. The people share the view that 
Islamic law (shari’a) is fundamental to daily life and thus must be integrated 
in all aspects of  life. However, like Islam in other places in Indonesia, the 
characteristic of  Islam in Madura emphasises primarily, but not exclusively, 
on aspects such as mysticism and local cultures. 
1 This paper is part of  Ph.D. dissertation at Leiden University. A number of  
data were collected from two sets of  fieldwork from July 2009 until January 2010 and 
from October 2010 until July 2011
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[Artikel ini menjelaskan tiga elemen penting budaya santri yang melekat 
pada masyarakat Madura, yaitu pesantren, mewakili elemen pendidikan 
Islam tradisional, Nahdlatul Ulama, mewakili organisasi Islam, dan kiai, 
merepresentasikan tokoh Islam. Ketiga elemen tersebut berjalin-kelindan dan 
membentuk relasi yang kompleks antara Islam dan politik sebagaimana 
dipraktikkan dalam masyarakat Madura. Dua persoalan penting yang 
hendak dijawab melalui artikel ini yaitu bagaimana karakter pesantren, 
Nahdlatul Ulama, dan kiai yang menjadi dasar Islam-santri di Madura dan 
bagaimana ketiga elemen tersebut saling terkait satu sama lain. Persoalan ini 
kemudian mengantarkan pada pertanyaan penting lainnya, yakni apakah 
Islam di Madura memiliki karakteristik dan bentuk yang berbeda dengan 
Islam yang hidup di wilayah lain di Indonesia? Sampai sekarang, meski 
masyarakat Madura mengalami pergeseran dalam menilai pendidikan 
modern, organisasi Islam, dan ulama, mereka masih tetap mempertahankan 
nilai-nilai sakral agama. Ini bisa dibuktikan dengan kuatnya pengaruh 
pesantren, Nahdlatul Ulama, dan kiai dalam urusan agama dan duniawi. 
Masyarakat Madura meyakini bahwa syariat Islam sangat penting dan perlu 
diterapkan dalam keseluruhan aspek kehidupan mereka. Namun, seperti 
Islam di wilayah lain di Indonesia, Islam di Madura juga sangat dipengaruhi 
oleh tasawuf  dan budaya lokal.]
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A. Introduction
Although Madura is not entirely different from other parts of  
Indonesia with regard to socio-religious characteristics, a stronger 
religious tradition appears to have emerged as a result of  a long-term 
Islamisation process on the island, perhaps comparable to what we find 
Islam in Aceh and Banten. At least two forms of  Islam can be identified 
in Madura: the santri culture and the non-santri culture. In the pesantren 
(Islamic tradisional boarding schools) tradition, we find santri2 (students 
2 In the Indonesian languages, such as Javanese, Madurese, and Bahasa Indonesia 
(the official language of  Indonesia), the term santri can be used in both singular and 
plural forms. Other non-English terms in this study can be used as both singular and 
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of  pesantren). However, in this study, referring to the term in pesantren 
tradition, santri is used primarily to refer to the majority of  Madurese 
Muslims, proponents of  more orthodox Islam with the global influences 
of  Sunni Islam, the largest denomination school of  the religion. In 
comparison, people of  the non-santri culture are in the minority among 
Madurese Muslims. This last group also adheres Sunni Islam. They 
embrace less orthodox form of  the religion influenced by local mystical 
belief  systems. I would maintain that santri culture in Madura can be 
represented by three main elements: Islamic education institutions, 
Islamic groups and Islamic leaders. Like in other religiously-associated 
regions, such as Aceh3 and Banten4, traditions and customs of  Madurese 
are rooted to religion. Consequently, it is not easy to draw clear distinction 
between tradition and religion. 
This paper focuses on the aspects of  santri Islam in Madura. It 
deals specifically with the principals on which three main elements 
of  the Madurese santri culture—the pesantren that represents Islamic 
education institutions, the Nahdlatul Ulama (the NU) that represents 
Islamic majority, and the kiai (religious leader) that symbolises Islamic 
leaders—have characterised and have become central elements of  both 
Islam and politics in Madura. Two major questions addressed in this 
paper related to the nature and character of  the pesantren, the NU, and 
the kiai within the tradition of  santri Islam in Madura, and how each of  
these elements forms relationships with the others. These questions lead 
to answer the main question: Is Islam in Madura different from Islam in 
other places in Indonesia?
Clearly, the kiai are the main actors in state-society relations in 
Madura. Along with other groups of  local leaders, such as the blater 
(local strongmen) and the klebun (village heads), they are social, political, 
economic, and cultural brokers, a function which contributing in its own 
plural forms as well.
3 Eric Eugene Morris, Islam and Politics in Aceh: a study of  Center-Periphery Relations 
in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983), p. 22; Yusny Saby, “Islam and Social 
Change: the Role of  the Ulama in Acehnese Society,” Ph.D. dissertation, Philadelphia: 
Temple University, 1995.
4 Martin van Bruinessen, “Shari’a Court, Tarekat and Pesantren: Religious 
Institutions in the Banten Sultanate,” Archipel, Vol. 50: Banten Histore d`une Region, 
1995, pp. 165-199.
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way the dynamic of  society. It should be kept in mind that the general 
situation in Madurese villages is not free of  conflict, not only between 
village officials and kiai, but also between individuals in the whole area. 
Villagers are divided into a number of  loose groups with different 
orientations and interests. Utilising their capabilities and resources, 
village officials and kiai seem to have, openly or not, challenged each 
other in order to secure their own interests. The local government, via 
village officials, has attempted to reduce the political influence of  kiai, 
especially during general elections. Meanwhile, through the networks 
of  pesantren and the NU, the kiai have later responded to government’s 
power by distancing themselves from the latter. This has created an odd 
situation, as the kiai are in fact needed by the government to ensure that 
politics goes smoothly at the grassroots level. As Elly Touwen-Bouwsma 
observes, at the village level, the support of  the kiai is key to involving 
villagers in the implementation of  government programmes.5 
B. Sketching Pesantren as the Core of  Islamic Education in Madura
In the history of  Islam in Indonesia, pesantren is generally regarded 
as traditional Islamic educational institutions. Pesantren is traditional in 
terms of  the content of  education, which is primarily religious; in terms 
of  teaching and learning processes; and of  management, which is mainly 
in the hands of  traditional ulama (religious leaders/teachers). There are 
at least three important roles of  pesantren in Muslim community: the 
centre of  transmission of  religious knowledge; the guardian of  Islamic 
tradition; and the centre of  ulama reproduction. Pesantren, and similar 
institutions in other parts of  Southeast Asia, such as surau, are the centres 
of  rural religious life, and they tend to be tradition-oriented and socially 
conservative.6 Pesantren plays a crucial role in the santri culture since the 
5 Elly Touwen-Bouwsma, “The Ulama of  Madura: Rise and Expansion of  a 
Religious Regime,” in Mart Bax, Peter Kloos and Adrianus Koster (eds.), Faith and Polity 
on Religion and Politics (Amsterdam: VU University Press, 1992), p. 100.
6 Azyumardi Azra and Dina Afrianty, “Pesantren and Madrasa: Modernization 
of  Indonesian Muslim Society,” Paper presented in Workshop on Madrasa, Modernity and 
Islamic Education, Boston University, CURA, May 6-7, 2005; Martin van Bruinessen, 
“Traditionalist and Islamist Pesantrens in Contemporary Indonesia,” in Farish A. Noor, 
Yoginder Sikand and Martin van Bruinessen (eds.), The Madrasa in Asia: Political Activism 
and Transnational Linkages (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2008), p. 218.
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nineteenth century of  the Dutch East Indies. Despite their traditional 
characteristics, pesantren as the centre of  education has developed into a 
central component of  modernisation.7 Besides providing regular Islamic 
teachings, pesantren has offered general secular subjects as mandated by 
the government in state curricula, such as history, Western languages, 
and science. Thus, these institutions have endeavoured to modernise 
their santri using a distinctive method.8 In the contemporary period in 
Indonesia, the Ministry of  Religious Affairs has reported that in the 
country there were 4,195 pesantrens with around 677,384 santris in 1977, 
in 1981 the numbers grew into 5,661 and 938,397 respectively. The 
number increased again in 1985, when the total number of  pesantren 
and santri reached 6,239 and 1,084,801. This increasing trend was also 
evident in 1997, when the number, reached 9,338 and, 1,770,768 santris. 
In 2003-2004 the Ministry noted that there were 14,647 pesantrens.9 In the 
Indonesian archipelago, East Java province is the centre of  the pesantren 
world. In Madura, Bangkalan and Pamekasan even label themselves “kota 
santri (santri town),” as other regencies in Madura, such as Sampang and 
Sumenep.10 
In Bangkalan alone, based on statistical records, the number of  
pesantren in 2000 was 169, growing member from 145 in 1995. The 
number of  male santri in 2000 was 21,131 and female santri was 20,013. 
7 Along with pesantren, the Sarekat Islam (the SI) in the early twentieth century 
introduced Madurese to the modern world. The SI provided Madurese with a new 
alternative in vertical relations between villagers and those who resided in town areas. 
A new alliance between urban intellectuals and rural religious leaders marked a new 
phase in the history of  Indonesian politics. See Kuntowijoyo, “Islam and Politics: the 
Local Sarekat Islam Movements in Madura, 1913-20,” in Taufik Abdullah and Sharon 
Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast 
Asian Studies, 1988), p. 109.
8 Ronald Lukens-Bull, “Teaching Morality: Javanese Islamic Education in a 
Globalizing Era,” Journal of  Arabic and Islamic Studies, Vol. 3, 2000, pp. 26-48.
9 Departemen Agama RI, Data Potensi Pondok Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia Tahun 
1997 (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 1997); Departemen Agama RI, Daftar Pondok 
Pesantren Seluruh Indonesia, 2003- 2004 (Jakarta: Departemen Agama RI, 2004) quoted 
in Jajat Burhanudin, “Islamic Knowledge, Authority and Political Power: the Ulama in 
Colonial Indonesia,” Ph.D. dissertation, Leiden: Leiden University, 2007, p. 2. 
10 Nowadays such claims are rather common in Java. Pandeglang in the Banten 
province has called itself  a santri town, while in the provinces of  West Java and East 
Java, the regencies of  Tasikmalaya and Jombang have the same claim.
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In 1995, the number of  male santri was 13,711, while the number of  
female santri was 12,314. In 2000, the number of  pesantren custodians, 
that is the main kiai and other guru ngaji (teachers of  Islamic knowledge 
and Quran reciting), was 2,323 males and 258 females (note that in 1995 
the member of  kiais were 734 males and 455 females).11 In 2006, the 
number of  pesantren in Bangkalan was 305 with 34,013 male santri and 
30,013 female santri. The number of  male kiai pesantren was 2,427, while 
there were 1,283 female kiai.12
In Sampang, the number of  pesantren in 2000 was 106. The number 
of  male santri in the same year was 17,612, while female santri 11,934. 
There were 1,055 male and 426 female pesantren custodians.13 The number 
of  pesantren in Sampang in 2009 grew to 282, whereas the male santri in the 
same year reached 33,650 and the number of  female santri was 22,745. The 
number of  custodians in 2009 was 3,907 of  males and 316 of  females.14 
Despite the introduction of  secular public and private schools 
in the villages in Madura in recent years, the number of  pesantren has 
grown. One of  the most important factors in the survival of  pesantren 
in the history of  Islam in Indonesia is their ability to accommodate the 
rapidly changing situation without losing some of  their fundamental 
traditional characteristic.15 This is to some extent unsurprising, given 
the historical fact that religious education has played a significant role 
in the history of  education in Indonesia. For example, pesantrens were 
the only form of  education in Java prior to the twentieth century.16 In 
nineteenth-century Madura, religious education fulfilled the need for 
Islamic knowledge, which was also seen as general knowledge. There 
were hardly any mosques in nineteenth-century West Madura, only one 
in Bangkalan and one in Sampang.17 However, langgar (small mosques) 
11 BPS, Bangkalan dalam Angka 2000, p. 83.
12 BPS, Bangkalan dalam Angka 2007, p. 146.
13 BPS, Sampang dalam Angka 2000, p. 48.
14 BPS, Sampang dalam Angka 2010, p. 97.
15 Azra and Afrianty, “Pesantren and Madrasa”, p. 2.
16 Taufik Abdullah, “The Pesantren in Historical Perspective,” in Taufik 
Abdullah and Sharon Siddique (eds.), Islam and Society in Southeast Asia (Singapore: 
Institute of  Southeast Asian Studies, 1988).
17 Touwen-Bouwsma, “The Ulama of  Madura”, p. 111. Mosques usually 
had penghulu (state religious officials) attached to them. At the end of  the eighteenth 
century in Nusantara (Indonesia before independence), penghulu at the regency level 
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were abundant. Langgar, besides functioning as houses of  prayer, also 
served as the lowest level education institutions and led by local religious 
teachers. In 1893, there were more than 50,000 langgars in Madura where 
children were introduced to basic Quran recitation, as the next step was 
entry into a pesantren if  they wished to advance their knowledge.18 
Pesantren in Madura are similar to those in Java and the Malay 
Peninsula. These institutions are centres of  the transmission of  traditional 
Islam with kitab kuning (the yellow books) serving as classical texts 
of  many branches of  Islamic knowledge19 These Islamic education 
institutions did not emerge before the eighteenth century, and in fact, 
they only became widespread in the latter half  of  the nineteenth century 
in the Netherland East Indies.20 
Pesantren exclusively belonged to kiai or a kiai family, and were seen 
as religious centres for the education of  santri who wished to become 
religious leaders. Pondok (lodges) as part of  pesantren were built in order to 
facilitate santri who came from afar to reside in the pesantren. In Pamekasan, 
according to oral tradition, Pesantren Batuampar was established around 
were appointed by the VOC as court advisors. In West Sumatra a penghulu was a head 
of  the nagari (similar to Javanese villages), whereas in Riau the position was at the same 
level as a village head. In Java and in Madura penghulu were religious officials in Islamic 
kingdoms and in regencies under Dutch rule. They had full authority in all state affairs 
concerning Islamic matters, mostly in the implementation of  shari’a law (Islamic law). 
They also served as the heads of  mosques, their main duties being to lead prayers and 
educate the umma (Muslim community). Penghulu had higher authority than qadi> (judges) 
or mufti> (one who issues fatwa - non-binding opinions concerning Islamic law) in classical 
Islamic countries because of  their roles in religious education in addition to their roles 
as heads of  mosques. See Muh} ammad Hisyam, “Potret Penghulu dalam Naskah: Sebuah 
Pengalaman Penelitian,” Wacana, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2005, pp. 125-133. In West Madura in 
the nineteenth century, penghulu were appointed and paid by the West Madurese rulers 
like most of  the officials. See Touwen-Bouwsma, “The Ulama of  Madura”, p. 111.
18 Kuntowijoyo, “Agama Islam dan Politik: Gerakan-gerakan Sarekat Islam Lokal 
di Madura, 1913-1920,” in Huub de Jonge, Agama, Kebudayaan, dan Ekonomi: Studi-studi 
Interdisipliner tentang Masyarakat Madura (Jakarta: Rajawali Pers, 1989), p. 43.
19 Martin van Bruinessen, “Pesantren and Kitab Kuning: Continuity and Change 
in a Tradition of  Religious Learning,” in Wolfgang Marschall, Texts from the Islands: Oral 
and Written Traditions of  Indonesia and the Malay World (Bern: Institute of  Ethnology, 
University of  Bern, 1994), p. 121.
20 Ibid., p. 131-133; Martin van Bruinessen, “Shari’a Court, Tarekat and 
Pesantren”, pp. 173-176; Merle Calvin Ricklefs, Polarising Javanese Society: Islamic and Other 
Visions, c. 1830-1930 (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2007), pp. 52-72.
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the second half  of  the nineteenth century. In Bangkalan, Pesantren 
Syaichona Kholil Demangan of  the famous Kiai Kholil, is also said 
to be founded at the same time. In the nineteenth century, there were 
statistical reports about the number of  santri in Madura. For instance, in 
1865 there were 2,504, in 1866 9,674, and in 1871 18,106.21
Children of  the Madurese elite had more options in schooling when 
the Dutch administration introduced secular education among the ruling 
aristocracy in the late nineteenth century. Even though the establishment 
of  secular schools affected the number of  pesantren pupils, religious 
learning was still well-suited to the prevailing expectations among the 
priyayi (local aristocracies) who wished their heirs to master wide-ranging 
knowledge of  both worldly and religious concepts.22 To cope with the 
popularity of  the religious schools, in 1905 the Dutch government issued 
a regulation to register all pupils and teachers at religious school, as well 
as teachers of  ngaji (Quranic recital), kitab (religious books) and tarekat 
(Muslim mystical brotherhoods).23 It was apparently common for santri 
to undertake lessons in different pesantrens. Studying in pesantren in Java 
became the next phase for highly motivated santri who, subsequently, 
would go to Mecca with financial support of  their family.
Many modern pesantren in Madura have attempted to combine 
secular subjects and Islamic teaching. According to Lukens-Bull, mixing 
the two is a way in which kiai and other pesantren figures (who together 
make up the pesantren custodians) are arranging ‘Islamic modernity’.24 
21 Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial dalam Masyarakat Agraris Madura, 1850-1940 
(Yogyakarta: Matabangsa, 2002), p. 331.
22 One example is Pangeran Aria Achmad Djajadiningrat, who spent some time 
in pesantren in the 1880s, before the Banten revolt in 1888. He went on to continue his 
studies at the Willem III School in Batavia. See Burhanudin, “Islamic Knowledge”, 
pp. 121-122. Meanwhile, several members of  the kraton (palace) of  Yogyakarta were 
also educated in pesantren. See John Pemberton, On the Subject of  “Java” (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1994), pp. 48-9.
23 Kuntowijoyo, “Agama Islam dan Politik”, p. 46.
24 Lukens-Bull, “Teaching Morality”, pp. 34, 38, 42. In his study of  three pesantren 
in East Java, Lukens-Bull suggests that kiai play arole in redefining modernity. Modernity 
in the pesantren world is seen as a set of  normative values that must be compatible with 
Islamic norms. Therefore Western materialism does not suit the criteria of  Islamic 
modernity. For pesantren people, modernity is the combination of  religious learning, 
development of  character, and secular schooling. These variables are designed to make 
Muslims capable of  living in a world without losing their Islamic values.
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Like in Java, pesantren in Madura emphasises Islamic teachings in their 
curricula, including, among others, Arabic learning, canonical collections 
of  traditions (hadith), Quran recitation and Quranic exegeses (tafsir). 
Some offer Madurese mystical Islam exercises. Others offer Quranic 
memorising25 or martial arts lessons.26 Although many pesantren in Madura 
now run their education systems in a more modern manner, in keeping 
with their more traditional counterparts, strict obedience to the kiai 
remains a distinct tradition that is maintained in every pesantren. 
During the New Order period, most pesantren leaders have 
developed a more dynamic mindset in response to the challenges posed 
by Soeharto’s administration to fulfil the rising demands of  employment 
in the business and government sectors following the development plans 
established by the new administration. The modernisation process is 
evident in the participation of  some pesantren people in politics. The 
involvement of  kiai pesantren (kiai who lead pesantren) in politics during 
the New Order, however, does not indicate a change in stance among 
traditionally conservative kiai into reformed and progressive ones. 
Although there is a tendency for kiai to give their political support to 
Partai Persatuan Pembangunan (PPP – the United Development Party), 
most Madurese kiai kept their distance from political parties during the 
New Order. Only a few kiai openly participated in politics. The new 
patterns of  kiai in politics, such as guiding older santri to support certain 
political party, were only evident in few pesantrens.
In Bangkalan, the celebrated Pesantren Demangan, and its 
associated pesantren,27 and Pesantren As Shomadiyah were places that 
25 Such as Pesantren Bustanul Ufat Assyaiin in Sampang.
26 Such as Pesantren Nuril Islam Gili in Kamal sub-district of  Bangkalan, 
established in 2000 by Kiai A. Bazids. Initially, it was a perguruan beladiri and tenaga 
dalam (martial arts and inner power college). Kiai Bazids is not of  kiai descent, yet he 
was traditionally trained in pesantren. In his youth, he often went in search of  esoteric 
sciences. Unlike many contemporary pesantren which offer formal education recognized 
by the government, this pesantren does not offer such a formal education. At Nuril Islam 
Gili, the santri may have formal education outside the pesantren. Nuril Islam Gili applies 
takri>r (memorising) and tah} fi>z} al-qur’a>n (reciting and memorising the Quran) methods in 
its tutoring system. Both are conducted every evening, except Thursday evening when 
martial arts lessons and inner power practices are taught.
27 There are a number of  pesantren that have close connections, or claim to have 
interrelated ties with Pesantren Demangan. These connections are not exclusively based 
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affirmed people’s political aspirations during Suharto’s era. In Sampang, 
Pesantren At Taroqqi of  Kiai Alawy Muhammad served a similar function. 
So long as the kiai of  these pesantrens remained as functionaries or at least 
supporters of  the PPP and championed the party, their constituents 
would vote the PPP. A number of  kiais, whom I talked to, emphasised 
the vital position of  the Kiai Kholil family. During the New Order, the 
entire Kiai Kholil family, such as Kiai Ami>n Imron, Kiai Makmun Imron 
and Kiai Abdullah Schal,28 openly supported the PPP. 
In other regencies, Sumenep for instance, not all areas are strongly 
influenced by orthodox Islam or santri culture. Places in Sumenep, such as 
Saronggi, Kalianget, and Gapurana, have preserved the tayub29 tradition up 
to the present.30 Nevertheless, Sumenep is still highly regarded as a centre 
of  religious schooling, for there are many respectable pesantrens, such as 
in Guluk-guluk and Prenduan. Moreover, among the modern pesantren in 
on family bonds. To name a few, Pesantren Syaichona Kholil 2, Pesantren Ibnu Kholil, 
and Pesantren Al Muntaha Al Cholili. 
28 Schal is an abbreviation of  Syaichona Kholil. Syaichona is an honoured title 
for Kiai Kholil. The title was attributed to Kiai Abdullah Schal when he became central 
figures of  the PPP, not only in Bangkalan, but also at the national level.
29 Tayub or tayuban is a traditional Central and East Java performing art whose 
dancers are called tledhek, taledhek, ledhek, tandhak or tandak. It is not only a recognised 
form of  entertainment, but also an integral part of  spirit shrine ritual associated with 
the annual bersih desa (spirit shrine ritual) festivity. In Yogyakarta the word tayuban is 
said to derive from the words mataya, meaning ‘dance’ in the Kawi language, and guyub, 
which means ‘communality or harmoniousness’. See Robert W. Hefner, “Islamizing 
Java? Religion and Politics in Rural East Java,” The Journal of  Asian Studies, Vol. 46, 
No. 3, 1987, pp. 533-54; Felicia Hughes-Freeland, “Tayuban: Culture on the Edge,” 
Indonesia Circle, No. 52, 1990, p. 39. The tledhek themselves claim to be Muslim, with 
some insisting that they are good Muslims. See Hefner, “Islamizing Java?”, pp. 533-554. 
Tayuban is also related to the traditional Javanese wedding ceremony, being performed 
after the ceremonial meeting of  the bride and groom. This tradition is believed to have 
started in pre-Islamic times. See Clara Brakel-Papenhuyzen, “Javanese Taledhek and 
Chinese Tayuban,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 151, No. 4, 1995, 
p. 546. Tayub in Madura is associated with that in Tengger, Pasuruan. In Gapurana, 
however, tayub performance is not necessarily identified with the bersih desa activity like 
in Tengger. It is held mostly during wedding feasts in which offerings to supernatural 
spirits play an integral part. See Muh} ammad Endy Saputro, Kiai Langgar and Kalebun: A 
Study on Contestation between Cultural Brokers in a non-Pesantren Village in Madura, Indonesia 
(Yogyakarta, Graduate School Gadjah Mada University, 2009), pp. 54-5. 
30 Ibid., p. 54.
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Madura, Pesantren Al-Amien in Prenduan, Sumenep, is worthy of  note, as 
it is particularly famous for its Arabic-oriented orthodoxy. With regard to 
this pesantren and the kiai in this religious network, it is worth noting how 
different the development of  Islam has been. In Sumenep the areas of  
Prenduan and possibly Guluk-guluk may be considered more orthodox 
in terms of  religious orientation than the rest of  Madura. Syarqawi, the 
founder of  the Pesantren Al-Amien was a learned man whose ancestors 
came from Kudus, Central Java. However, his leadership of  the pesantren 
was short-lived, because the more traditionally religious-oriented people 
in the area rejected his strong Arabic orthodoxy and suspected the 
fact that he came from outside Madura. Following his expulsion, he 
established a pesantren in Guluk-guluk. His old pesantren in Prenduan was 
passed down to his disciple, Kiai Achmad Chotib.31 The expulsion of  
Syarqawi from Prenduan by local people is similar to the situation of  the 
Muhammadiyah (the second largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia) 
since its introduction on the island. The traditional features of  Islam in 
Madura indicate that many modernist Islamic ideas, like Muhammadiyah’s 
attempts to ’purify’ un-lawful innovation of  Islamic traditions (bid’ah), 
is not well accepted. 
C. Outlining the Nahdlatul Ulama as the ‘Religion’ of  the 
Madurese
The NU has a great impact on Madura. For instance, in the 1971 
general elections (Pemilihan Umum/Pemilu), of  the total number of  
votes in all regencies in Madura, 817,561 went to the NU party and 
300,399 to Golkar, compared, for instance, in East Java province only 
4,379,806 went to the NU and 6,837,384 to Golkar.32 At glance, these 
numbers show us how central the NU and PPP were in 1971 to the 
Madurese in general and to the Madurese kiai in particular, since the 
kiai were the most important factor behind the success of  the party in 
persuading the people in politics.
The NU is by far the largest Islamic organisation in Indonesia, with 
approximately forty to fifty million followers who are heavily concentrated 
31 Huub de Jonge, Madura dalam Empat Zaman: Pedagang, Perkembangan Ekonomi, 
dan Islam: Suatu Studi Antropologi Ekonomi (Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989), pp. 242-4.
32 BPS, Pemilu 1971 di Jawa Timur, pp. 170-1.
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in Central and East Java provinces.33 The organisation was founded on 
31 January 1926 in Surabaya by a number of  renowned kiai, most of  
whom owned Islamic boarding schools, including Kiai Hasyim Asy`ari 
of  Jombang and Kiai Wahab Hasbullah of  Surabaya. The NU sees its 
function as being the guardian of  sacred tradition by maintaining the 
four madhab teachings, although it is the Shafi’i religious school that has 
been predominantly embraced by Indonesian Muslims.34 This indicates 
the NU’s acknowledgement of  the great ulama of  the four madhab in 
interpreting the Quran and hadith. From its inception, the NU’s main base 
of  support has been rural East Java, including Madura where traditional 
Javanese practices and ways of  life absorbed elements of  Islam. Rural 
kiai have authority especially when their influence is bolstered by a web 
of  martial alliances between leading kiai families and a network of  kiai-
santri relationships throughout East Java. This social base of  support for 
the NU has expanded over time, also attracting some urban and more 
educated followers.35
In the later period after the establishment of  the NU in 1926, 
the decline of  the SI in Madura marked a new era in Madurese history. 
The association of  the SI with modern and reformed attitudes was 
unsuccessful in drawing Madurese people to get involved in politics. 
Following the decline of  the SI, the NU plays a central role with the 
most rural followers who actively participated in politics. People are 
attracted to the NU primarily because of  the non-political orientation of  
the organisation during its early years, whereas the political orientations 
33 See Mitsuo Nakamura, The Crescent Arises over the Banyan Tree: a Study of  the 
Muhammadiyah Movement in a Central Javanese Town (Yogyakarta: Gadjah Mada University 
Press, 1983); Andrée Feillard, NU vis-à-vis Negara : Pencarian Isi, Bentuk dan Makna 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1999); Saiful Mujani and R. William Liddle, “Indonesia’s Approaching 
Elections: Politics, Islam, and Public Opinion,” Journal of  Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 1, 
2004, p. 111.
34 Bernard Johan Boland, The Struggle of  Islam in Modern Indonesia (The Hague: 
Nijhoff, 1982), p. 11; Feillard, NU vis-à-vis Negara, p. 13.
35 Allan A. Samson, “Conceptions of  Politics, Power, and Ideology in 
Contemporary Indonesian Islam,” in Karl D. Jackson and Lucian W. Pye (eds.), Political 
Power and Communications in Indonesia (Berkeley: University of  California Press, 1978), 
pp. 196-226.
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of  the SI led to losing followers.36 As in Java, in Madura most nahdliyin 
(coined to mention the followers of  NU) perceived the NU primarily as 
a religious organisation, rather than a political association. The NU has 
become popular and taken over the SI’s position in the late 1920s, as an 
organisation that was able to spread out to rural areas. 
The NU attracts local kiai and many villagers, due to its perspective 
that appreciates more traditional and syncretist aspects of  Islam in 
Madura. In addition, the prominence of  Kiai Kholil of  Bangkalan was 
also used by NU leaders to encourage a sense of  pride among Madurese 
religious leaders by stressing that Kiai Hasyim Ashari, Kiai Wahab 
Chasbullah, Kiai Bisri Syansuri, and Kiai Maksum, all founding members, 
were once students of  Kiai Kholil. NU leaders expected, therefore, that 
Madurese ulama would be proud of  their legendary Kiai. Being members 
of  the NU, or even just being sympathetic to the NU, was interpreted as 
protecting Islam from potential threats of  reformists and modernists. 
The success of  the NU’s top figures in rallying their colleagues was a 
reflection of  rural Muslim life in the Archipelago centering in pesantren. 
The NU was also far more hospitable than the SI or the Muhammadiyah 
to mystical-magical practices and the NU kept strictly to the old traditions, 
showing a lack of  interest in shifting direction towards a more modern 
stance. The NU’s conception of  Islam seems to have fit the Madurese 
santri culture. 
Under Suharto’s authoritarian administration, Indonesia 
experienced the enforced adoption of  Pancasila (the official five pillars 
and philosophical foundation of  the Indonesian state) as the sole ideology. 
Suharto’s administration used Pancasila to curtail religious freedom, 
forcing Indonesians to accept it in a standardised way. There was almost 
no opportunity to disagree with, or to oppose the state’s version of  
Pancasila.37 All Muslim associations, either in the form of  political parties 
or socio-cultural movements, were forced to accept Pancasila as their 
sole philosophical base. The NU accepted the idea to varying degrees. 
Within the association, kiai and politicians competed with each other for 
ultimate leadership of  the NU. This struggle was prominent after the 
36 Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, Pencarian Wacana Baru 
(Yogyakarta: LKiS, 1994), pp. 47-8. 
37 Nicola Colbran, “Realities and Challenges in Realising Freedom of  Religion or 
Belief  in Indonesia,” The International Journal of  Human Rights, Vol. 14, No. 5, 2010, p. 682.
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1982 general elections (i.e. in the immediate aftermath), when a group of  
Madurese kiai demanded that the NU avoid politics by leaving the PPP. 
Despite its acceptance of  Pancasila, a number of  Madurese kiai in the 
NU refused to officially adopt Pancasila as the ideological base of  the 
organisation.38 Even today, many of  the kiais in Madura, with whom I 
had conversations, are still not in favour of  Pancasila, and consider the 
philosophical ideology as a legacy of  secular government.
For many santris in Madura, being a Muslim means being a 
sympathiser of  the NU. This strong identification with the NU does 
not automatically mean that they have to officially become a member of  
the organisation. They are considered to be born as true nahdliyin who 
will guard the principles of  Sunni Islam and obey instructions of  kiais. 
In Madurese politics, this means that not voting for the NU party, or 
NU-associated political parties, is sinful 39 During the New Order, it was 
even worse if  political muslim support Golkar, a government party that 
was seen as the major threat to Islam.40 Nonetheless, although there was 
a political barrier between the leaders of  NU and the government, NU 
elites in Madura were aware that recognition from the state was crucial in 
promoting their organisation in villages. For instance, prior to the 1984 
Situbondo Muktamar (NU National Congress), leading figures of  NU 
Pamekasan repeatedly emphasised the government’s agreement, which 
included the President’s permission to hold the 1984 congress.41 
Before the 1971 elections, the NU in Madura had openly sponsored 
38 Iik Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian World: Ulama of  Madura (Yogyakarta: 
Gadjah Mada University Press, 1990), p. 379. 
39 After 1973 the support turned to the PPP, and in the post-Suharto period 
the majority support was given to the PKB with some to the PKNU. Prior to the 1971 
elections, Kiai Bisri Syansuri issued a fatwa stating that it was an obligation for Muslims 
to participate in general elections and to vote for the NU. See Martin van Bruinessen, 
NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, p. 98. He issued another fatwa before the 1977 elections, 
this time asking Muslims to vote for the PPP. 
40 Other areas showed a similar attitude. For instance, in Jombang, Kiai Musta’in 
Romly (d. 1985) of  Pesantren Darul Ulum, Rejoso, was of  Madura origin and never 
occupied a vital position within the NU. His choice to represent Golkar in the DPR (the 
National Parliament) led to discrimination by his colleagues. See Martin van Bruinessen, 
“Tarekat and Tarekat Teachers in Madurese Society,” in Kees van Dijk, Huub de Jonge 
and Elly Touwen-Bouwsma (eds.), Across Madura Strait: the Dynamics of  an Insular Society 
( Leiden: KITLV Press, 1995), p. 99. 
41 Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian World, pp. 123-4.
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many village festivities. Following the participation of  Golkar in the 
1971 elections, efforts to transform village officials into Golkar cadres 
and sympathisers became trend. This led to the reluctance of  the village 
officials to support the NU. Consequently, many village festivities were 
held neutrally under local initiatives. Furthermore, during the New Order, 
despite its departure from politics, the NU continuously attempted to 
maintain its dominance in the PPP. As a result, the government could 
not neglect NU activities in villages. Under Suharto’s administration, 
this uneasy relationship manifested itself  in the government’s limitation 
to NU social activities. One of  consequences was preventing the NU 
from posting signs in front of  any NU offices or its leader’s home in 
the villages.42 Today, it is common to see NU signs in many places in 
Madura, such as in every fifty to one hundred metres along the main road 
in Bangkalan, which connects the regency with Sampang. Moreover, it 
is now beneficial to have a strong identification with the NU, especially 
for new and young cadres who are just involved in politics, as the NU—
despite its ‘repression’ by the New Order administration—has always been 
a favourable political vehicle capable of  placing its cadres in important 
political posts.
The withdrawal of  the NU from the PPP after the 1982 elections 
led to bewilderment in the local context.43 While in other places the 
42 Ibid., pp. 203-204. This consequence seems a clear indication of  the prevalence 
of  the state doctrine of  massa mengambang/lepas (floating mass) introduced in 1971. The 
doctrine was the ideological foundation of  suppression of  political activity of  the people. 
According to this semi-official principle, people should be released from the restraints of  
political party activities which prevent them from devoting their full energy to economic 
development. This doctrine builds on the idea that people should cooperate in mutual 
assistance, consensus and Pancasila, rather than fight for their own political interests. 
See Hans Antlöv, Exemplary Centre, Administrative Periphery: Rural Leadership and the New 
Order in Java (Richmond: Curzon Press, 1995), pp. 36-7. The floating mass doctrine 
was not necessarily effective in de-politicizing the rural populace, not least because it 
did not target religious practices that often linked the supporters of  non-government 
parties, especially the PPP, to their actual leaders, such as Friday mosque attendance 
and religious congregations (pengajian). See Ken Ward, “Soeharto’s Javanese Pancasila,” 
in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.), Soeharto’s New Order and its Legacy (Canberra, 
ANU E Press, 2010), p. 27.
43 Musyawarah Nasional Alim Ulama NU (Munas Situbondo 1983 - the 1983 
Situbondo Convention) and Muktamar ke-27 Situbondo 1984 (the 1984 27th Congress) 
indicated reconciliation between the NU and the Suharto’s administration marking 
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removal was somewhat less problematic to accept, in Madura, NU 
followers were undecided on whether to vote for the PPP in the next 
1987 elections. The uncertainty was caused by many kiais who, unlike 
most kiais in Java, were still strongly affiliated with the PPP. A number 
of  kiais in Madura believed that voting for Golkar would mean treachery 
to Islam. As a result the PPP remained the only feasible party to vote. 
To avoid confusion, the kiai decide to employ a more pragmatic attitude 
and persuade the nahdliyin to vote for a party that defends and promotes 
Islamic values. This was taken by the nahdliyin as a plea to vote for the PPP. 
Muslim organisations, like the NU, were not explicitly democratic 
when they were founded. But, the NU was successful in gathering 
many followers, especially in rural areas. This was mainly due to the 
kiai networks and, as a result, the NU was successful in mustering kiai 
devotees into a more integrated group. In the New Order period in 
Madura, a more united group within the NU became the major force in 
rallying votes for the NU party and later for the PPP. This more integrated 
faction of  the NU typically consisted of  local religious leaders, such as 
kiai langgar, ustaz in local madrasah, or imam/kiai of  village mosques. After 
the NU decided to leave politics, these local religious leaders acted as 
political advisors for villagers’ political concerns, perhaps because of  their 
awareness of  the world outside the village. The higher-ranking kiais or 
kiais from large pesantrens remained observant and applied a ‘wait and see’ 
strategy, although in the end most Madurese kiais kept their allegiance 
to the PPP.44 The PPP was still seen as a major channel of  kiai socio-
the emergence of  new elites in the NU board. The 1983 Convention resulted in two 
decisions: the departure of  the NU from politics and the adoption of  Pancasila as sole 
ideological base. The 27th Congress stressed this decision. See Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, 
Indonesian Politics under Suharto: Order, Development and Pressure for Change (London and 
New York: Routledge, 1993), p. 124; Francois Raillon, “The New Order and Islam, or 
Imbroglio of  Faith and Politics,” Indonesia, No. 57, 1993, pp. 197-217; Kees van Dijk, 
“Kiai and Politics,” Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Vol. 152, No. 1, 1996, pp. 
109-143; Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, pp. 113-115. Prior to 
the 27th Congress, the chairman of  the NU, Kiai Idham Chalid encouraged nahdliyin 
to have free political aspirations, being able to aligning themselves not only to the PPP, 
but also possibly to Golkar or the PDI (Jawa Pos, 31 August 1984).
44 In other places, there were more kiais who were in favour of  the departure of  
the NU from the PPP. For instance, prior to the 1983 Convention, and after the 1982 
elections, several regional-national functionaries of  the NU, such as Yusuf  Hasyim, 
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economic-political interests, and as an important network for reinforcing 
their ties with other kiais. 
After the New Order collapsed, many Madurese kiai became 
more pragmatic in their political orientation. In the first two elections 
of  1999 and 2004, Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa (the PKB – the National 
Awakening Party), as the party backed by the NU leaders, enjoyed 
victory in all regencies in Madura. The PKB in return provided the 
NU with opportunities and financial support. Several members of  the 
East Java local parliament from the PKB faction donated a small part 
of  their salaries to the NU of  East Java in the early 2000s.45 In the 2009 
elections, although the party still won, the margin was insignificant.46 
Apparently, the atmosphere in the Madurese political context has changed. 
As a comparison, during the New Order the NU’s financial support 
derived primarily from contributions. Moreover, trading companies and 
businesses were established, and donations were collected to form stable 
financial resources for the organisation.47 
Despite the accusation by some nahdliyin that the NU in Madura 
has been involved in politics too far, some segments of  the NU in 
supported the plan for the official withdrawal of  the NU from the PPP. Hasyim became 
the most visible victim of  PPP conflicts prior to the 1982 elections as he was moved 
from number 1 to number 32 on the list of  the parliament candidates members from 
East Java province. See Martin van Bruinessen, NU, Tradisi, Relasi-relasi Kuasa, pp. 
165-166. The position of  general secretary of  the PPP in its first National Congress/
Muktamar in 1984 was eagerly sought by many factions within the party. The NU was 
one of  them. In a meeting at the NU headquarters at the same time as the muktamar, 
Kiai Hasyim Latief, the head of  NU East Java, declared that if  the NU did not occupy 
the general secretary position, the NU should withdraw itself  from the PPP (Jawa 
Pos, 22 August 1984,). Mardinsyah, a non-NU politician, was elected as the general 
secretary of  the PPP. He was assisted by six deputies, namely Yudo Paripurno, H.M. 
Ansyari Syam, Husni Thamrin, Ali Tamin, Djerkasy Noor, and Ismail Mokobombang 
(Jawa Pos, 23 August 1984). 
45 Interview with Kiai Nuruddin, a former member of  Dewan Perwakilan 
Daerah (DPD – The Regional Representative Council) during the period from 2004 
to 2009, representing the East Java province on 4 March 2011.
46 The number of  seats in the DPRD Bangkalan achieved by political parties in 
the 2009 elections was as follows: PKB 10 seats, PPP 5, PKNN 5, Demokrat 4, PBR 
3, PAN 3, Hanura 3, PDIP 2, PPD 2, PNBK 2, Republikan 2, Golkar 1, Gerindra 1, 
PDP 1, PKS 1 (Radar Madura, 22 April 2009).
47 Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian World, pp. 123.
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Madura remain orthodox in terms of  attitudes towards shari’a issues. 
A number of  ulama in Madura, such as those of  the Majelis Ulama 
Indonesia (MUI-the Council of  Indonesian Ulama), the Muhammadiyah 
and the NU, have, responded negatively, to and publicly disapproved 
of, the discourse on Rancangan Undang-undang Hukum Terapan Pengadilan 
Agama Bidang Perkawinan (Legal Draft of  Religious Court’s Applied Law 
in Marriage Section), which penalises people who conduct an unofficial 
marriage (nikah siri), a marriage that is not recorded at the Local Office 
of  Religious Affairs (Kantor Urusan Agama - KUA). Even though many 
Madurese ulama do not wish their daughters to become victims of  nikah 
siri, they believe that nikah siri is lawful according to shari’a.48 It should 
also be noted that some kiais, predominantly those of  lower rank in rural 
areas, still practice polygamy. Their second marriages are mostly nikah siri. 
It seems that disapproval of  the Rancangan did not solely derive from a 
religious point of  view. Furthermore, ulama in Bangkalan, such as those 
of  the NU and Badan Silaturahmi Ulama Pesantren Madura (Bassra–the 
Association of  Family of  Madurese Pesantren Ulama) have mutually 
supported the proposal of  Regional Regulation (Peraturan Daerah - 
Perda) on the obligation for female government officers, and female 
students above nine years old, to wear jilbab (veil, headscarf), as proposed 
by the NU of  Bangkalan. The proposal has been frequently quoted as 
compatible with the characteristic of  Bangkalan as kota santri. Two young 
kiais, Imam Bukhori Kholil and Nasih Aschal, both descendants of  Kiai 
Kholil, have underlined the obligation as a matter of  urgency due to 
the number of  female students and female employees in public spheres 
who do not completely cover their aurat/awrat (the intimate parts of  the 
body, for both men and women).49 The proposal has generated various 
reactions. Many support, and as some schools in Bangkalan openly do so,50 
while only a minority of  non-governmental organisations and academics 
object the obligation.51 
In addition to matters of  dress, the ulama of  NU Sumenep have 
voiced concerns about love messages using mobile phones. The ulama 
believe that these ‘vulgar’ conversations are incompatible with shari’a. 
48 www.nu.or.id, 23 February 2010, accessed on 6 September 2010.
49 www.nu.or.id, 31 July 2009, accessed on 7 September 2010.
50 www.swarapendidikan.com, accessed on 22 August 2011.
51 http://cmars.synthasite.com/syahadah, accessed on 22 August 2011.
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They also believe that the individuals involved in phone conversation 
usually decide to meet and have illicit relationships. They also argue that 
many married couples have divorced because of  these types of  affairs.52 
Nevertheless, these attitudes towards shari’a should not be seen solely as 
absolute indications of  strict orthodoxy by all kiais of  the NU in Madura, 
as many show no objection to traditional cultural elements such as karapan 
sapi (bull racing) that contradicts shari’a points of  view. 
The orthodox thoughts of  the NU in Madura have been well 
preserved by the kiai as an ultimate symbol of  santri Islam in Madura. 
This has ensured that the NU kiai are highly regarded among the nahdliyin. 
NU followers will participate in events organised by NU kiai if  they know 
that many renowned kiai will also take part. Many of  them blindly obey 
kiai’s words without further questioning the meaning behind the speech. 
Istighosah (communal prayer) is one of  the most attended events organised 
by the NU, along with muktamar. Although other Muslim organisations 
also regularly hold the event, the NU usually attracts larger numbers. 
During the ethnic conflicts in Kalimantan, NU in Madura frequently 
conducted istighosah to pray for the safety of  people who were severely 
affected by the conflict. One of  the largest prayer meetings was held 
on 8 March 1997, fifteen East Javanese kiais led around 50,000 nahdliyin 
in prayer at the alun-alun (square) of  Bangkalan.53 Most nahdliyin were 
attracted by the presence of  prominent kiais, such as Kiai Idris Marzuki 
of  Lirboyo, Kiai Hasyim Muzadi, the head of  the NU of  East Java, 
and Kiai Abdullah Schal of  Pesantren Demangan. Intresting, despite 
their participation in religious occasions, some nahdliyin are involved 
in kemaksiatan (sin, immoral acts).54 Regardless of  this, the degree of  
obedience among NU followers in Madura to NU kiais and the NU itself  
is high so that the NU can be considered as ‘religion’ of  the Madurese. 
There is a popular anecdote that illustrates the strong connection between 
the Madurese and the NU. It is said that the late Abdurrahman Wahid 
52 www.kabarmadura.com, 19 December 2009, accessed on 13 September 2010.
53 Jawa Pos, 9 March 1997.
54 Kiai Mashduki Fadly (a former parliament member as well as a leading kiai in 
Bangkalan) told me that he often noticed the madurese nahdliyin gambling and drinking 
alcohol. When approached, these individuals vowed never to repeat these actions, and 
proudly showed their NU identity card in their peci (prayer hat) (Interview with Kiai 
Mashduki Fadly on 1 December 2009).
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(Gus Dur, a former chairman of  the NU and President of  Indonesia) 
once visited Madura. A Madurese person proudly told Gus Dur that 
99 per cent of  Madurese people are Muslims, while only one per cent 
are Muhammadiyah followers. The story, despite its exaggeration, 
indicates that even today the rejection of  Muhammadiyah -and also of  
reformed and modern Islam- by madurese is evident. It signifies a strong 
acknowledgement of  the NU in Madura. The NU in Madura, is basiclly 
moderate and has been triumphant in establishing political moderation.55 
It also indicates a high degree of  accommodation and adaptation. 
D. The Emergence of  Ulama as Religious Leaders
A strict distinction between the term ulama and kiai does not appear 
in this paper. According to Deliar Noer, the term kiai indicates two 
kinds of  people. The first comprises those whose knowledge of  Islam 
surpasses that of  ordinary man and who typically devote themselves to 
teaching of  islam. The second type is closely related to a dukun (healer) 
who is associated with mystical and secret doctrines and practices all 
kinds of  medicine.56 Hiroko Horikoshi distinguishes between the terms 
kiai and ulama. For Horikoshi, the difference lies primarily in the more 
extensive charisma that a kiai possess. The ulama play more roles in 
the social system and the social structure of  villages and their ultimate 
status is legitimised by hereditary factors. Among the people, the kiai are 
higher than the village ulama, and their presence is regarded as a unifying 
symbol in society, since their moral and spiritual leadership is not tied 
to normative structure of  a village.57 In Madura the term kiai has also 
a meaning in terms of  leadership. In a broader context, the term ulama 
refers to men of  Islamic learning and Islamic religious leaders in general. 
Hence, I use both terms, ulama and kiai, interchangeably. 
Over centuries, religious leaders developed their own methods in 
disseminating Islam in Nusantara. During the late nineteenth and early 
twentieth centuries, haji played a pivotal role in the spread of  Islamic 
55 Greg Barton, “The Prospects for Islam,” in Grayson Lloyd and Shannon 
Smith (eds.), Indonesia Today: Challenges of  History (Singapore: Institute of  Southeast Asian 
Studies, 2001), p. 122; Mujani & Liddle, “Indonesia’s Approaching Elections”, p. 122.
56 Deliar Noer, The Modernist Muslim Movement in Indonesia, 1900-1942 (Singapore: 
Oxford University Press, 1973).
57 Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial (Jakarta: P3M, 1987).
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thought in the Netherlands Indies. In that period, larger numbers 
of  returning pilgrims added the number of  religious leaders in the 
Indonesian archipelago.58 The number of  people who performed the 
pilgrimage increased every year. In Madura in 1880 there were 896 haji, 
in 1885 there were 1,111, and five years later in 1890 there were 1,364. 
Haji who were not in charge of  a pesantren were highly regarded, not 
because of  their capability in religious knowledge, but mainly because 
of  their financial ability to afford the expensive trip. In the second half  
of  the nineteenth century, only a few farmers had the opportunity to 
perform pilgrimage, compared to better-educated people such as village 
secretaries. This changed in the early twentieth century as more farmers 
and merchants—due to better economic conditions—were able to go 
to Mecca.59
In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, haji and kiai 
formed central elements of  religious circles in Madura. It is not easy to 
separate haji and kiai in that period, exept that Kuntowijoyo believed 
that haji and kiai were different in many ways. According to him, kiai 
were not appropriate figures for organising modern social movements. 
Their charisma alone was not sufficient if  it was not accompanied by the 
capability to arrange social movements. On the other hand, hajis were able 
to contribute to the ongoing social changes in society due to their high 
mobility and exploration of  areas outside their places of  origin. Even 
if  a haji did not have adequate abilities in religious authority, his socio-
religious status was highly appreciated. In distinguishing kiai and haji, 
Kuntowijoyo gives an example of  a rebellious kiai in the village of  Prajan 
in Sampang. This kiai acted not only as a religious teacher, but also as a 
dukun and a fortune teller. He delivered provocative sermons, requesting 
that villagers should take an active role in combating discrimination 
from the Dutch. The resulting uprising ended in the deaths of  twenty 
villagers and injured twelve.60 Moreover, Kuntowijoyo argues that haji 
were more orthodox in identifying themselves with universal Islam. As 
an example of  the haji group, he pointed to the hajis of  Sarekat Islam, 
58 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt of  Banten in 1888, Its Conditions, 
Course, and Sequel: A Case Study of  Social Movements in Indonesia (`s-Gravenhage: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1966), p. 155.
59 Kuntowijoyo, Perubahan Sosial, pp. 333-335.
60 Ibid., pp. 337-45.
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who were belived to be pious individuals, as being merchants and urban 
citizens. Meanwhile, kiai belonged to the peasantry and village elites. In 
sum, he considered the kiai as power brokers with the ability to mobilise 
the people, whereas haji were cultural brokers.61 These suggestions seem 
to be inaccurate since it is not simple to draw a distinction between kiai 
and haji in the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries in Madura. 
For example, although the well-known reformist Kiai Jauhari of  
Prenduan, Sumenep, was a teacher of  Tijaniyah tarekat, he associated his 
pesantren with an Arab-oriented orthodoxy and sent his sons to modern 
Pesantren Gontor. One of  his sons studied in Mecca and became a staff  
member of  Muslim World League. To a large degree, Kiai Jauhari was 
considered more progressive than most other Madurese kiais,62 and played 
a pivotal role in Islamic resurgence. He adopted modern methods in his 
pesantren, which was rare in the Madurese pesantren circles at that time. 
Kiai Jauhari as both a kiai and a returned haji, along with other religious 
leaders in Prenduan, established a branch of  the Hizbullah guerrillas. 
This guerrilla group, consisting of  santri and pesantren graduates, was 
actively involved in the resistance against the Dutch during the Military 
Aggression of  1947.63 Under Kuntowijoyo`s classification, Kiai Jauhari 
acted as both a power broker and a cultural broker. Nowadays, all kiais 
from pesantren have to perform pilgrimage to Mecca in order to gain the 
respected title of  ‘Kiai Haji’ (KH), which indicates the kiai’s reputation 
in both religious and economic realms.
Another example of  kiai who acted as both a power broker and a 
cultural broker is the legendary Kiai Muh} ammad Kholil of  Bangkalan, 
the most celebrated kiai in the history of  Madura. There are many stories 
about this legendary figure, most of  which are marked by myths. Kiai 
Kholil is probably one of  the best examples of  a returned haji who served 
as a religious teacher and a religious leader who spread his influence 
on society. He was born in the first half  of  the nineteenth century 
(between 1819 and 1835), and died around 1923-1925.64 He was known 
61 Kuntowijoyo, “Islam and Politics”, pp. 108-38.
62 Van Bruinessen, “Tarekat and Tarekat Teachers”, pp. 91-117.
63 De Jonge, Madura dalam Empat Zaman, p. 256.
64 No one knows the exact date of  birth or death of  this kiai, as his lifetime is 
not well documented. A recent book published in June 2010 gives a story from Kiai 
Muh} ammad Ghozi Wahib praising Kiai Kholil`s heroic role in the struggle against the 
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not only as a wali (saint), but also as an expert in Arabic letters, a master 
in fiqh (Islamic jurisprudence), and mystical power. He is regarded as an 
important figure in the formation of  a santri community in the Indonesian 
archipelago, where his renowned santri established new pesantren as soon 
as they returned to their places of  origin. In other words, he produced 
kiai and laid down a strong foundation for the creation of  a kiai-pesantren 
network. Today, a considerable number of  Madurese and Javanese kiai 
consider him their indirect guru, because many leading kiais in Java, such 
as Kiai Wahab Hasbullah and Kiai Hasyim Asyari, two of  the founders 
of  the NU, studied in his pesantren.65 Kiai Kholil is still alive in the minds 
of  the Madurese, both those who live in the island and migrated some 
where else. To many pilgrims, his grave is considered as the final place 
in a pilgrimage for the people of  Banten to Madura. When I visited 
Bangkalan in the last quarter of  2009, the mosque and the surrounding 
area of  his grave was under construction. When I returned in the first 
quarter of  2011, the project was completed and several new facilities 
had been added. 
For the present-day Madurese, religious leaders mean kiai. 
However, the term kiai in Madurese tradition is not static throughout 
time. In the earlier periods, kiai was a title for people who had a special 
characteristic, either in a positive or a negative sense. Therefore, a 
criminal or even a Chinese Muslim merchant could be called a kiai if  
he played a special role in society. Kiai was also a Madurese noble title.66 
The Madurese noblemen, especially the regents, had close relationships 
with each other as they had family ties. In Pamekasan, for instance, a 
‘aggressors’ on 10 November 1945 in Surabaya (p. 101). However, on an earlier page, the 
author writes that Kiai Kholil died in 1925 (p. 82). See Ibnu Assayuthi Arrifa`i, Korelasi 
Syaikhona Muh} ammad Kholil Bangkalan & NU: Mengenang dan Menghayati Perjuangan Sang 
Inspirator (Kediri, Al-Haula Press, 2010). Many lower ranking ulama I have met often 
mentioned Kiai Kholil`s epic participation in the struggle against the colonialists, both 
the Dutch and the Japanese, without being aware of  the anachronism. 
65 Zamakhsyari Dhofier, Tradisi Pesantren: Studi tentang Pandangan Hidup Kiai 
(Jakarta: LP3ES, 1982); Martin van Bruinessen, “Tarekat and Tarekat Teachers”; Mokh. 
Syaiful Bakhri, Syaichona Kholil Bangkalan: Kiai Legendaris dari Madura (Pasuruan: Cipta 
Pustaka Utama, 2006); Saifur Rachman, Biografi dan Karomah Kiai Kholil Bangkalan: Surat 
kepada Anjing Hitam (Jakarta: Pustaka Ciganjur, 2001).
66 Zainalfattah, Sedjarah Tjaranya Pemerintahan di Daerah-daerah di Kepulauan Madura 
dengan Hubungannya (Pamekasan: The Paragon Press, 1951), pp. 68-9.
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significant number of  the descendants of  Adikoro (one of  the rulers 
of  Pamekasan in the eighteenth century) became ulama in Pamekasan 
(Sumberanyar, Banyuanyar, Batuampar, and Tattango), Sampang (Prajan), 
and in some places in Java, such as Bondowoso (Blindungan, Pancagati, 
and Prajekan), Situbondo (Panjhi, Sukorejo, Asembagus, and Bajulmati) 
and Probolinggo (Klapasawit, Randupangger, and Kebonsari). Besides 
tracing their lineage back to Adikoro, these ulama were also said to be 
descendants of  Sunan Giri and Sunan Bonang (two of  the nine Javanese 
saints), and Pangeran Asmorokingking of  Mataram.67
In contemporary Madura, there are several types of  kiais. Kiai 
pesantren are generally regarded as the highest in rank. There are also kiai 
tarekat who usually lead a pesantren, But the letter are commonly known 
as tarekat teachers. The next category is kiai dukun, shamans or medicine 
men. The last and the lowest in the hierarchy of  kiais in Madura is kiai 
langgar, who run a small mosque in villages. The first type of  kiai is the 
real agents of  socio-political-economic-cultural life in Madura, and is the 
most ideal representatives of  the santri culture. They are what Eric Wolf  
identified as cultural brokers; people who ‘connect the local system to 
the larger whole’68 and who define what is appropriate for local society. 
Kiai pesantren and also kiai tarekat are cultural brokers due to their relative 
wealth. Kiai take advantage of  their possessions, which may be in the 
form of  materials, such as land or money, or non-material capital, such 
as the accumulation of  knowledge. 
In the nineteenth century, kiai tarekat, kiai pesantren and other 
religious figures, such as guru ngaji, imam (leaders of  prayer), juru kunci 
(custodians of  graveyards), merbot (gatekeepers of  mosques), modin 
(muezzin), and naib (sub-district penghulu) were able to improve their 
positions within villages. This was particularly true for those were involved 
in arranging religious life in villages, including maintaining pesantren. They 
were needed especially during ritualistic festivities, which are still held 
preserved until the present day.69 Moreover, some kiais, besides showing 
67 Ibid., pp. 107-8.
68 Eric R. Wolf, “Aspects of  Group Relations in a Complex Society: Mexico,” 
American Anthropologist, Vol. 58, No. 6, 1956, pp. 1065-78.
69 The most famous are rokat desa and rokat bandaran. The former is an annual 
ritual to bless a village and to provide village inhabitants with harmony, safety and 
prosperity. The latter is a sea-based feast to sanctify the fishermen and ensure a great 
Religious Networks in Madura
Al-Ja>mi‘ah, Vol. 51, No. 1, 2013 M/1434 H 25
their capacities as men of  Islamic learning, also performed mystical 
Islam rituals, such as fortune telling, healing people’s illnesses and giving 
martial arts lessons. Supernatural powers, drawn from mystical Islam, 
were important attributes with regard to power and authority society. 
Madura, like other places in the Netherlands Indies in the nineteenth 
century, witnessed these situation.
Meanwhile, under pressure from the Dutch colonial administration, 
local elites slowly joined the administration during the nineteenth 
century. For religious figures and villagers, this meant that the elite had 
allied themselves with the infidel power. As a result, religious leaders 
and villagers were disappointed and dissatisfied, as they viewed the 
elite idealistically supposed tobe autonomous and influential leaders. 
The people then searched for others to provide guidance. Before the 
nineteenth century, native kingdoms had mufti>, qadi>, and law courts 
where, in many cases, shari`a was implemented, usually in harmony with 
the foreign authorities’ laws and customary regulations.70 This situation 
changed in the nineteenth century when they became mere tools of  
the colonial bureaucracy. After the East Indies were placed under the 
authority of  Governor-General Herman Willem Daendels in 1808, he 
reorganised the administration. Daendels created a centralist government. 
All government affairs were under direct control of  Batavia. The colonial 
government based the administrative mechanism on a western model, 
placing sultans and their families under the Dutch colonial government, 
and converting them into bureaucrats. Daendels’s aim was to run the 
government under direct rule, so that he could rule the people without 
local leaders as intermediaries.71 
However, people could not accept their leaders to be integrated 
into the colonial administration. Unlike local political elites, the religious 
figures such as kiai succeeded in preserving their independence. Villagers 
gradually turned to these religious figures. This does not mean that they 
only occupied a fundamental position among the villagers after Daendels 
catch as well as safety. Despite the strong association with pre-Islamic beliefs, religious 
leaders are needed to lead these ceremonies. In turn, the religious leaders enjoy a highly 
respected position among the villagers as well as receiving economic benefits.
70 Martin van Bruinessen, “Global and Local in Indonesian Islam” in Tonan 
Ajia Kenkyu, Vol. 37, No. 2, 1999, p. 164.
71 Sartono Kartodirdjo, The Peasants` Revolt, p. 52.
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came into power. They had been central local leaders in religious, spiritual 
and limited social matters previously. The decline of  the local elite’s legal 
leadership led the ulama in turn to reinforce their position in society. The 
changes in the local hierarchy due to the Dutch colonial government in 
Madura can be seen as the main factor by which ulama tried to strengthen 
their position as religious leaders.
In the Indonesian archipelago during the nineteenth century when 
the implementation of  colonial power became effective, religious leaders 
primarily emerged in the periphery and frequently rebelled against the 
local and Dutch authorities.72 In Madura, Islam in the nineteenth century 
reached a more systematic stage. Old pesantren grew fast and new ones 
were built. A number of  well-off  villagers became followers of  kiai and 
facilitated them by financing their pesantren, a pattern that has continued 
until today. Hence, the emergence of  kiai as religious leaders was, to 
some extent, a utilisation of  local assets.73 Religious forum and discussion 
by the kiai pesantren, along with pengajian (Islamic congregations), gave 
kiai a sense of  Islamic religious authority. Therefore, the patron-client 
relationship between kiai and their followers is predictable.74 
E. The Ties between Elements of  the Santri Culture
Madurese people have continuously preserved their own sacred 
values, as the three main elements of  santri culture, pesantren, NU and 
kiai have had a great influence on society, in both religious and worldly 
domains. Moreover, these three main elements of  santri culture form 
religious networks in Madura. The networks are controlled by the kiais 
who appear to have become a vital connector between the three elements 
above. 
The oldest and most endurant tie that has been present for 
hundreds of  years is perhaps the relationship between pesantren and 
kiai. Although kiai are able to exert their influence beyond the pesantren, 
but without a pesantren a Madurese kiai is like a captain without a ship.75 
Highly motivated santri with financial aid from kiai parents and who have 
72 Martin van Bruinessen, “Global and Local”, p. 164.
73 Iik Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian World, p. 36.
74 Hiroko Horikoshi, Kiai dan Perubahan Sosial, p. 174.
75 Interview with Kiai Mashduqie Fadly on 1 December 2009.
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finished their studies tend to build pesantren in their area of  origin if  they 
are able to do so. This often depends on support from the kiai of  the 
pesantren where they studied, or marriage to a kiai’s daughter. The latter 
means that the future kiai will be supported by two families. These new 
kiais will be the mission of  Madurese culture. If  they study at various 
pesantrens, ties between new kiais and pesantren will be futher stegthened. 
The second important tie is between pesantren and the NU. Unlike 
the Muhammadiyah, whose formal schools are spread all over the country, 
the NU has never built many formal schools. NU kiai believe pesantren, 
even in their most modern form, are still the most appropriate place to 
undertake religious learning and secular education. They also believe that 
establishing a pesantren will help maintain a kiai’s personal reputation as a 
guardian of  Islamic values. Therefore, it is not surprising that until 1974, 
the number of  religiously-based educational institutions (pondok pesantren 
and madrasah) in Madura was higher than the number of  general schools.76 
To large degree, NU kiai have encouraged the Nahdliyin to educate their 
children in pesantren, rather than in general schools. The NU followers, in 
turn, have enjoyed the services of  kiai in the form of  religious festivities 
and personal links. 
Last but not least is the tie between the NU and kiai. The NU 
has provided the kiais with extensive networks which link kiai to the 
wider world. The organisation has also introduced kiai to the world of  
politics and social welfare. In turn, the NU has enjoyed a large number 
of  villagers to the political party and later on to NU-associated political 
parties such as the PPP, the PKB or the PKNU. Kiais support has also 
been instrumental in financing the NU’s regular events, such as the 
grand pengajian or tabligh akbar (grand tabligh, as a term tabligh means 
propagation of  the messages of  Islam). This perhaps indicates what Eric 
Wolf  discusses in terms of  group relations. He argues that the reliance 
of  communities on a larger system affects them in two ways. Firstly, 
the whole communities play specialised roles within the larger context. 
Secondly, special functions pertaining to the whole become the tasks of  
special groups within communities in what Wolf  calls ‘nation-oriented 
groups.’77 The NU kiai rely heavily on the NU as the larger system. Along 
76 Iik Mansurnoor, Islam in an Indonesian World, p. 170.
77 Eric R. Wolf, “Aspects of  Group Relations”, p. 1065.
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with the Nahdliyin, the kiais preserve Islamic values as well as the sacred 
values of  the Madurese. Within the NU, the special, political-economic, 
tasks are assigned to kiai who are more observant in worldly domains. 
These form the ‘nation-oriented groups’ who, according to Wolf, are 
‘frequently the agents of  the great national institutions which reach down 
into the community’.78
F. Conclusion
In the present day Indonesia, religious life has not been integrated 
into the politics of  the state, and although a number of  religious leaders 
occupy bureaucratic positions, most religious elites in Indonesia are not 
affiliated with bureaucracy. However, they do continue to play important 
roles in Indonesia. In Madura, kiais are without doubt the main actors 
in state-society relations. They have become cultural, economic, and 
political brokers. By keeping their distance from the state, kiais have 
been successful in maintaining their positions in society. They have been 
aware of  possible risk of  being alienated and isolated not only from 
their followers, but also from their horizontal networks among religious 
circles. More importantly, they are concerned that their high position in 
society may gradually fade away if  they do not keep their distance from 
the state. For some kiais, utilising their positions and personalities is a 
tool to gain and preserve positions and status. For others, focusing on 
religious matters is the decisive means by which they continuously adapt 
to changing situations, along with the rapidly changing administrations.
One may note that Islam has firmly established its position within 
local socio-cultural and socio-political configurations in Madura, and 
that Islam has been used and promoted by its supporters against secular 
state policies. However, it is impossible to answer the question ‘Is Islam 
in Madura different from Islam in other places in Indonesia?’ in one 
single formula. What we may witness is that unlike contemporary Aceh 
or Banten, which have been perceived as regions with a strong Islamic 
adherence and which seem to be increasingly shari’a oriented, Madura 
tends to cling strongly to Islamic values and norms without denying the 
presence of  local syncretist cultures, and in fact the supporters of  each 
culture shows that Islam and local traditions can live side by side. 
78 Ibid.
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